

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Treating Southern Africa as an Intelligence and Policy Totality

FROM:

Graham E. Fuller  
VC/NIC

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC 04686-86

25X1

DATE

9 October 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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*a good, thoughtful memo.  
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 04686-86  
9 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller  
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Treating Southern Africa as an Intelligence and  
Policy Totality

1. I believe we need to devote more attention to the problem of Southern Africa as a single strategic entity. Most analysis on Southern Africa tends to cloud a broader strategic vision of the issue by dividing it into three distinct categories of concern:

- The growingly intractable problems of South Africa itself.
- The problems of anti-Marxist insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique -- of major importance to the US in global East-West terms.
- The northern states of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Zaire, all of which are linked to each other and to the South African problem through transportation ties, and support for the ANC (except Zaire on the ANC). Our relations are deteriorating with at least two of them.

The major danger in treating these as separate elements is that the morasse of South Africa itself is increasingly likely to polarize the region and fuse these three separate issues into a single whole -- Black Africa under seige from Pretoria and apartheid.

2. The net impact on US interests in this polarization scenario are severe.

- We will be at odds with Pretoria, losing influence with the government as an increasingly hostile anti-Western black movement emerges.

This Memo is Classified  
SECRET in its entirety.

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- The states of Zimbabwe and Zambia will almost surely move toward increasing confrontation with Southern Africa due to a) their support for sanctions, b) support for the ANC and, c) the punitive economic measures taken against them by Southern Africa.

3. These two states -- Zambia and Zimbabwe -- will therefore probably be developing real security needs to protect them from South African action. They will not be likely to diminish support to the ANC and probably will increase it -- regardless of potential economic cost. They will cast about for alternate transport routes which South Africa will attempt to stymie.

- The USSR is the one logical state to which these states might turn to meet the real security concerns that these states possess. A greater Soviet defensive role would be in part just an extension of the Soviet security role in Angola and Mozambique. A growing Soviet defense commitment is likely to enhance the Soviet presence in Zambia, Zimbabwe and the region. A broadening of the "anti-imperialist, anti-racist" nature of the struggle will bring Zimbabwe and Zaire closer to Angola and Mozambique. Cuban troops might find a growing natural defensive role in these states.
- For the Russians this is almost a freebie. It involves extremely limited risk of confrontation with the US. It places them four-square on the side of defense against Pretoria which enjoys universal condemnation. The USSR will be in a major position to gain major strategic influence over these states and to try to deny them to the West if tension and confrontation arises. The major question for the Soviets is whether there are important -- and unproductive -- resource costs to the involvement.

4. So far, Zaire itself is still outside of the confrontation picture. Should Mobutu, however, decide that the West is not meeting his needs, or should either Luanda or Maputo decide to pressure Zaire or seek to bring it into some kind of transportation complex against South African interests, Zaire might encounter pressures pushing it to join with Angola and Mozambique to insure transportation routes and to join the rising African chorus of anti-South African sentiment.

- Such a problem in Zaire is obviously not imminent, but could well be part of a longer term regional calculus.

5. Only if we view all of these states as an analytic whole will a true perception of the problem over the next five years emerge.

6. Fred Wettersing [redacted] and I discussed the need for a more comprehensive look at this issue. It is the kind of a paper that probably needs to be written by an NIO since it

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involves so many different countries and comprises such a broad strategic problem. Indeed, such a paper might best emerge -- at least initially -- as an in-house NIC paper, possibly convertible to an Estimate later depending on the results.

7. I have sought the assistance of a competent and already tested external analytic organization, [redacted] to draw together a seminar which will explore the complex interrelationship of strategic issues that are emerging in Southern Africa. This group worked on a similar and very successful project for the Agency during the Rhodesia crisis in 1976, and brings interesting methodology to bear as well. I have asked ALA to co-participate and to share in the cost.

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8. [redacted]

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[redacted] Botha is squandering opportunities both to play divide-and-conquer politics among the black movements or to encourage meaningful black moderates like Buthelezi to emerge.

- Numerous people have pointed out that Western capital and businesses could represent one of the most enlightened components of a forward policy to encourage moderation in an emerging black force in Africa. Western businesses lead the pack in successful apartheid-busting. Western investment rather than divestiture in these areas -- however politically difficult in terms of US domestic politics -- would seem to offer one of the few creative opening wedges into that society. In principle it could even attract much US black interest.
- I am impressed with the number of interesting organizations -- many black -- that are interested in pursuing the goal of a non-ANC non-communist South Africa. I understand Loretta King was slightly disturbed that ANC representatives prevailed against her wish to meet with Buthelezi when she visited South Africa. In addition there are other groups working this problem.
- Freedom House.
- The Washington-based African Human Rights Committee, headed by Aradom Tebla -- a Christian Eritrean from Ethiopia who is strongly anti-communist and trying to bring together working groups to encourage non-communist movements in South Africa.
- The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York, which is developing programs for training of black non-communist cadres in South Africa and working for greater Western involvement in investment in black South African or anti-apartheid white businesses.

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[REDACTED]

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who works with a local consulting firm on energy that I'm in touch with.

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
The AFL-CIO is in close contact with anti-communist black labor unions in South Africa.

10. It seems to me that some interesting ideas and information could come out of these and many other groups. I have discussed them with a lot of people including Max Singer, formerly of Hudson Institute, and [REDACTED] both of whom are actively working in a business capacity with several of the above groups and are willing to be helpful.

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11. This is a narrow spectrum to work -- but I'm not sure I see a lot of other alternatives. At least many of these groups are pursuing goals which are positive, democratic, anti-communist and activist -- which just might pass policy muster even given the current domestic US policy mood on South Africa. And we will need a vehicle by which to play some role in the whole Southern African problem [REDACTED]

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Graham E. Fuller

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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